On the Participation and Reputation of Financial Advisors in Corporate Acquisitions
Takeovers are events in which, at least according to reports in the financial media, the financial advisors of both the targets and the bidders play crucial roles. Many of these advising firms have taken on an aura of wizardry in takeover deals. Despite their prominence in the popular press, previous researchers find little or no evidence that advisors create value for their clients in acquisitions. For instance, Servaes and Zenner (1996) find that neither financial advisor representation on behalf of the bidder nor the reputation of the bidder's advisor is related to the abnormal return to the bidder. This lack of empirical evidence is puzzling since firms involved in takeover contests continue to seek advice from financial advisors.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, while the extant literature largely concentrates on bidder firms, we relate the characteristics of the takeover deals and the ensuing wealth effects to (i) the participation and (ii) the reputations of financial advisors for both the target and the bidder firms. Second, we allow for the possibility that the roles of financial advisors in takeover contests may be different depending on whether the client firm is the target or the bidder. Finally, our analysis accounts for the fact that the roles of the bidder and target financial advisor are inter-linked by being advisors to opposite parties in the same deal and, therefore, we control for the presence (and reputations) of the advisors to both parties in the contest. To see the importance of this observation, suppose the bidder hires Morgan Stanley, a highly reputed financial advisor, to gain a bargaining advantage and the target responds by employing Goldman Sachs, another highly reputed financial advisor.
Then, even if hiring a reputable advisor brings a bargaining advantage, the fact that both (opposing) parties to the contest have employed equally reputable advisors would likely nullify any advantage to either firm. Consequently, in any analysis, for example in one utilizing multivariate regressions, the likelihood of finding a relation between bidder (or target) wealth effects and financial advisor reputation would be, by definition, low. In fact, if the analysis detected, for example, a positive relation between bidder wealth change and the reputation of its advisor, then, ceteris paribus, because a takeover is a constant sum game, the analysis would yield a negative relation between target wealth changes and its financial advisor reputation. In order to alleviate the impact of this feature of takeovers, our research design investigates the relation between target (bidder) wealth changes and financial advisor participation and reputation while controlling for the bidder's (target's) financial advisor choice.
We analyze the roles of financial advisors, to both the target and acquiring firms, in 282 successful tender offers that occurred over the period 1981 to 1994. Specifically, we attempt to answer the following questions: (i) Is there any relation between deal characteristics and the decision to use an advisor by bidder and target firms?, (ii) Is there any relation between wealth effects and participation of advisors?, (iii) Contingent on hiring an advisor, is there any relation between deal characteristics and advisor reputation, as measured by the choice of bulge versus non-bulge advisor by the client firm?, (iv) Again, contingent on employing an advisor, is there a relation between client wealth effects and its choice of bulge versus non-bulge advisors?, and (v) As the target's (bidder's) advisor, does advisor reputation, as measured by the average of each year's market share of the takeover market over our sample period, correlate with the average wealth effects measured over all the target (bidder) firms advised by the financial advisor? 1 We document systematic patterns in takeover deal characteristics and wealth effects vis-à-vis advisor participation as well as advisor reputation. Our findings on deal characteristics are as follows: (i) deals in which both the target and the bidder are relatively small, are less likely to involve advisors; (ii) a target firm is less likely to employ an advisor when there are multiple bidders; (iii) both the target and the bidder are more likely to employ advisors when the deal is more complex; (iv) the target is more likely to employ a higher reputation advisor when the bidder has a larger toehold in the target firm; (v) when the bidder is relatively larger than the target, the target is more likely to employ an advisor; and (vi) a bidder is more likely to employ an advisor and, in that, one with a higher reputation, when there are multiple bidders. These findings on deal characteristics imply that the primary reason that a firm utilizes a financial advisor, or a higher-reputation advisor, is to "level the playing field." Whenever a party in a takeover perceives that it is at a disadvantage, the target because of its relatively smaller size or because of a larger bidder toehold, and the bidder because of the presence of multiple bidders, it employs the services of an advisor, in all likelihood, a prestigious one.
Our findings on wealth effects are: (i) the absolute and relative wealth gains to the target are uncorrelated or possibly negatively correlated with its employing an advisor; (ii) conditional on employing an advisor, the absolute and relative wealth gains to the target are significantly positively associated with the reputation of its advisor; (iii) for the bidder there appears to be no relation between wealth effects and advisor reputation; (iv) when the client is the target firm, the advisors' reputations as measured by their average market shares, are positively associated with the average absolute and relative wealth gains of their client firms; and (v) when the bidder is the client, the higher reputation (market share) advisors have a better ability to find mergers that result in higher overall (combined bidder and target) synergistic gains. 2 The first finding that the wealth gain to targets is lower in those cases when they employ an advisor deserves explanation. While this finding may seem counterintuitive, it appears more reasonable when one considers the hiring of an advisor by a target as a response to a takeover offer from a bidder. If the bid premium is sufficiently high, the target will readily succumb to the takeover without hiring an advisor. On the other hand, when the offer price is low enough to make the costs (for example, possible loss of position of the manager) of the takeover greater to the target manager than the benefits, the target is more likely to seek the expertise of an advisor to try to raise the bidder's offer price. If the above scenario does indeed unfold in the takeover arena, empirically we will observe lower target gains for those takeovers in which the target employs an advisor. More importantly, we do find that, contingent on the target hiring an advisor, higher advisor reputation is associated with higher target abnormal wealth gains, as well as a greater proportion of the total synergistic wealth gains accruing to the target.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the complex roles of financial advisors and provides a framework for analysis. Section 2 describes our data sources, deal characteristics, and wealth effects for the entire sample. The next section presents our research design. Section 4 presents our findings from the analysis of deal characteristics and wealth effects for different levels of advisor participation. The results on the relation between the choice of bulge versus non-bulge bracket ('prestigious' versus 'nonprestigious') advisors and deal characteristics and wealth effects is presented in the following section. In Section 6, we present our findings on the relation between advisor reputation as measured by its market share and client wealth gains. The last section concludes the article.
The Role of Financial Advisors in Corporate Acquisitions: A Framework for Analysis
The role of financial advisors has received significant attention in the finance literature primarily in the field of capital raising. In the capital raising setting, a financial advisor is employed by the firm that is trying sell securities to the market. If the market is differentially informed about the true value of the firm's securities, the advisor is the intermediary who produces information regarding the value of the security being offered to the market. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) have shown that in such a setting, investment banks have the incentive to offer an accurate valuation of the securities even though doing so entails a cost to them. Investment banks are willing to incur information production costs in the short run, because they maximize future profits by acquiring reputation. An important implication of this framework is that the better the reputation of the advisor, the better the resolution of asymmetric information about security value and, consequently, lower the announcement stock price effects. The evidence presented in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Michaely and Shaw (1995) is consistent with this prediction.
The role of the advisor in an acquisition is, however, more complex because of several factors: (a) both parties are at least partially uninformed, (b) the advisor performs multiple functions for the client, and (c) the other party in the contest may also have an advisor. In the capital-raising scenario, the privately informed security seller employs the advisor to convey the value of the firm to the uninformed market. In the case of an acquisition, however, the advisor is employed by the (possibly) less informed (outsider) bidder to value a firm (the target) in a potentially "hostile" environment, thus making valuation more complicated.
Furthermore, in an acquisition, the distinction between the informed and the uninformed is fuzzy. As far as the "stand-alone" value of the target is concerned, the target may be more informed than the bidder. On the other hand, the bidder is more likely to be privately informed about the potential synergy gains that will emanate from the acquisition.
An acquisition generally involves a bidder (or bidders) and a target each of whom is trying to maximize its share of the total gains from the acquisition. 3 The advisors retained by the bidder and the target, therefore, may perform some combination of the following three functions: (i) search for potential targets (bidders) for the bidder (target), 4 (ii) determine the target's and bidder's stand-alone values as well as the gains from synergy, and (iii) engage in strategic activities. 5 Strategic activities on the part of the bidder advisor may include designing offers that jointly maximize bidder profit and the probability of takeover success. 6 In the case of the advisor to the target firm, the strategic activities may range from deploying takeover defenses to locating alternative suitors. It is also important to note here that the combination of the above activities performed by the bidder advisor will, in all likelihood, be significantly different from the combination undertaken by the advisor to the target. We conjecture that the prior search and the valuation activities in the case of the bidder advisor and the strategic activities in the case of the target advisor receive greater prominence.
Possibly owing to the complexities outlined above, to the best of our knowledge, there is no rigorous theory outlining the role of a financial advisor in an acquisition setting. 7 There are, however, some empirical studies that have investigated the role of the financial advisor in corporate acquisitions. Bowers and Miller (1990) infer from their analyses that investment bankers, in particular those with higher reputations, have the ability to detect "better" mergers but do not bring "bargaining advantage to acquisition negotiations. " Michel, Shaked, and Lee (1991) find that advisor reputation, in general, does not explain abnormal stock price movements around the acquisition announcement. They do, however, note that the relatively less reputed advisor, Drexel Burnham and Lambert, performed better than the other five more reputable advisors in their sample in providing acquisition bid advice to their clients (bidders). Rau (1998) investigates the relation between bidder advisor reputation, contingent fee payments, and the performance of bidding firms in mergers and tender offers. He finds that, in mergers, neither advisor reputation nor contingent fee payments affect deal outcome or the post-acquisition performance of the bidder. In tender offers, he reports a positive relation between reputation and both contingent fee payments and deal outcome. He also finds a negative relation between reputation as well as contingent fee payments with the postacquisition performance of the bidder. He infers from these results that the contingent fee structure in tender offers is used to ensure that bidder advisors complete deals regardless of value creation for the bidders, and that advisor reputation is built on the ability to complete deals. Servaes and Zenner (1996) do not find a significant role for financial advisor reputation in acquisitions, but they document that transaction characteristics are a key determinant of the bidder's choice of whether to employ an advisor. Their study provides a useful framework for analyzing the financial advisor choice by bidding firms.
The lack of guidance by a theoretical model and the complex nature of the activities discussed earlier, however, limits the unambiguous hypotheses that can be tested. The possibility that the roles of bidder and target advisors are different, for example, implies that the presence or absence of an advisor or the level of the reputation of the advisor would have different implications for the deal characteristics and wealth effects for bidder and target firms. Further, the roles of the bidder and target financial advisor are inter-linked by being advisors to opposite parties in the same deal. In estimating the relation between wealth effects and/or the sharing of the gains in takeovers and the reputation of the financial advisor, therefore, the research design must control for the impact of the financial advisor for the other party.
In general, irrespective of the activity that the advisor is called upon to perform for the client, maximizing the client's welfare is consistent with an advisor's objective of building and maintaining reputation. This assertion will hold despite the contractual features of the client-advisor relationship outlined in McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( , 1992 . McLaughlin documents that the contingency features in both the bidder and target advisor contract provide incentives to 7 While the model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) can be applicable to the valuation role of the bidder's advisor, it does not include the possibility that the other side could, strategically, utilize the services of an advisor.
the advisor to complete the deal "at any cost." He, however, argues that the reputation building concerns of the advisor would, to a large extent, nullify these perverse incentives.
The model of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) can also be interpreted in the context of acquisitions to imply that advisors will act in the best interests of their clients in order to build reputation.
The empirically testable implications of the above claim are, as discussed earlier, more difficult to outline. We conjecture that if advisors possess special abilities in addition to valuation and bargaining, they are more likely to be involved in deals with characteristics that call for such abilities. Deal characteristics that influence transaction costs or the relative bargaining positions of the firms in the contest are likely to play a role in explaining advisor involvement. Benston and Smith (1976) argue that financial intermediaries exist because they help mitigate transaction costs. Servaes and Zenner (1996) , extending this argument to an acquisition context, conjecture that firms will likely employ a financial advisor if transaction costs are expected to be high. They find that transaction costs are an important determinant of financial advisor choice (participation and reputation) by the bidder. Since more complex takeover contests are associated with higher transactions costs, advisor participation itself as well as the choice of more reputed advisor, by the bidder and target firms, is likely to occur in takeovers that are more complex. Next, if advisors have special bargaining or negotiating abilities, an advisor, a possibly more reputed one, is more likely to be retained by a party that believes that it is in a weaker bargaining/strategic position relative to its opponent. Thus, we should see (more reputed) advisors representing clients that are at a bargaining disadvantage. The influence of financial advisors on the takeover wealth effects must also be considered within the complex environment of acquisition contests. The relation between absolute wealth gains and advisor reputation should be positive. This conjecture does not, however, take into account the effect of the reputation of the advisor retained by the opponent. Similarly, the proportions of the total wealth gain from the acquisition accruing to the bidder and the target should be positively related to the reputation of their respective financial advisors. 8
Data Sources, Deal Characteristics, and Wealth Effects
The information on the identities of the firms involved in the tender offers, their financial advisors, the dates for the significant events in the takeovers, the prices offered and the prices paid, the existence of anti-takeover measures, and the outcomes of the tender offers are obtained from The Worldwide M&A Section of the data base provided by Securities Data
Company (SDC) . Information on the market shares of the various financial advisors is also obtained from this data source. The start of a contest is defined as the first announcement of a bid for the target provided there has not been a bid for the target in the one year prior to that date. 9 For contests to be included in the sample, we impose the following criteria: (i) both the bidder and the target firm should have returns data over the period 300 days prior to the announcement of the first bid for the target through five days after the announcement of the ultimately successful bid, (ii) the offer is not solely a self tender offer, and (iii) the tender offer is successful, where a contest is deemed to be successful if any shares are tendered. 10 Our final sample consists of 282 successful tender offers that were conducted during the period 1981 -1994. hostile, (ii) target has anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place, (iii) a family owns more than 20 percent of the target, (iv) there is pending litigation with the deal, (v) the deal needs regulatory agency clearance, (vi) the state in which the target is incorporated has anti-takeover laws, and (vii) the bidder's offer is two-tiered, and are respectively zero otherwise. The mean (median) value for CPLEX is 1.52 (1.00).
Deal characteristics

Wealth effects
Let AWT and AWB denote the change in the wealth (owing to the takeover) of the shareholders of the target and the acquiring firms, respectively. The total synergistic gain from a successful takeover is denoted by AWC and is defined as
AWC = AWT+ AWB
The gain AW may accrue from many reason(s) including changes in demand and supply conditions, technology, economies of scale and/or scope, and managerial efficiencies. The estimates of the gains created by tender offers will be based on the abnormal returns to firm shares. For firm i on day t, the abnormal return AR it , is given by
where, R it is the realized return to firm i on day t, α i and ß i are market model parameter estimates for the firms return generating process computed for 240 days of return beginning 300 days before the announcement of the first tender offer bid in the contest.
For the target firm in the sample, CART is obtained by cumulating the daily abnormal returns over the period beginning with trading day -5 relative to the first date of the first bid and ending at the close of the fifth trading day after the announcement of the final successful bid. For the bidder, CARB is obtained by cumulating the daily abnormal returns over the period beginning with trading day -5 relative to the first announcement by that bidder and ending at the close of the fifth trading day after the announcement of the final successful bid. 13 These cumulative abnormal returns for a firm are denoted by CAR. Using these CARs, we estimate the dollar gain to the target and the acquiring firm as:
AWT i = MVT i . CART i , and AWB i = MVB i . CARB i .
where MVT i and MVB i are the market values of the outstanding shares as of the sixth day prior to the announcement of the first bid of the target and the acquirer firms, respectively.
Finally the combined percentage synergistic gain, CAR i is measured by cumulating the abnormal returns to a value-weighted portfolio of the ith target and the ith acquirer where the weights are MVT i and MVB i for the target and the acquiring firm respectively. The combined CAR is measured over the same window as for the target. The statistics for determining the significance of these measures are computed as in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) .
The wealth effects of the takeover transactions for our sample of 282 tender offers are presented in The wealth effects are measured over a longer window than in Bowers and Miller (1990) and Servaes and Zenner (1996) so as to encompass the entire contest. This allows us to capture multiple bids and the dynamics of the tender offer process more completely. Bowers and Miller use two-day announcement period returns to compute wealth effects for both the bidder and the target. In addition, they eliminate multiple bid contests from their sample. Servaes and Zenner compute wealth effects for the bidder over a two-day announcement period relative to the first announcement by the successful bidder and over a period that encompasses the entire contest for the target.
instance, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) report the mean CART, CARB, and CARC to be 31.77 percent, 0.97 percent, and 7.43 percent, respectively. Table 2 provides additional information regarding the distribution of abnormal wealth gains to the target, bidder, and target and bidder combined. In slightly more than half of the deals (146 of 282), the bidder's abnormal wealth gains are non-negative.
Panel B of
Wealth gains for target shareholders are non-negative for a much larger proportion of the contests, 271 out of 282 deals. Interestingly, while the proportion of deals in which AWT is non-negative is significantly higher than the proportion for which AWB is non-negative, AWB is greater than AWT in 78 contests. Thus, the abnormal wealth gains to bidder shareholders are greater than the abnormal wealth gains to target shareholders in almost 28 percent of the sample. Denoting those 217 contests in which the combined wealth gain was positive as "good", we find that in over 34 percent of the contests the wealth gain to bidder shareholders is greater than that to target shareholders. This high proportion of deals in which bidder wealth gains are greater is surprising in view of the conventional wisdom that the gains in a takeover generally accrue to the target.
In addition to the absolute measures of abnormal wealth gains, we compute two variables that attempt to measure the "relative" gains to the bidder. The first is WDIFF which is defined as AWB -AWT, the excess of abnormal bidder wealth gain over target wealth gain.
The second variable, BPROP, is the measure of the proportion of the combined gains which accrue to the bidder. When the combined wealth created (AWC) is positive (good deal), BPROP is defined as the ratio of the abnormal wealth gain to the bidder (AWB) to the total wealth created in the deal (AWC). On the other hand, if the combined wealth created is negative (bad deal), we define BPROP as [1-(AWB/AWC)]. 14 Panels C of Table 2 provides 14 Bowers and Miller (1990) also investigate whether financial advisor reputation is related to the portion of the total gain to the bidder and the target. If the combined wealth created is positive, they define the portion of the wealth gain to the bidder (BPROP) as AWB/AWC. If the combined wealth gain is negative, they compute the portion of the wealth gain to the bidder as -(AWB/AWC). When AWC is negative, this variable definition leads to rankings that appear to be counterintuitive. To illustrate this point, consider the following two deals. In the first deal, AWB = 3, AWT = 7, and AWC = 10. In the second deal, AWB = -3, AWT = -7, and AWC = -10. The Bowers and Miller BPROP measure will take on the value of 3/10 in the first deal and -3/10 in the second deal. These rankings are contrary to the fact that the bidder does relatively worse than the target in the first deal, while the bidder does relatively better than the target in the second deal. Our definition of BROP, on the other hand, gives us values of 3/10 and 7/10, respectively. Thus, our measure would correctly indicate that the bidder does relatively better in the second deal. While our measure of BROP may provide more intuitive rankings for a larger set of possibilities, we acknowledge that defining the proportionate gain to the bidder is fraught with difficulties when AWC is negative, and inferences related to this variable should be made with caution. Furthermore, outliers may be produced when AWC is small.
descriptive statistics on our two measures of relative abnormal wealth gains to the bidder. The mean and median values for WDIFF are -$187.55 million and -$32.45 million, respectively.
The mean and median values for BPROP are -0.57 and 0.03, respectively. Again, the median values for these relative wealth gain measures are vastly different from the means.
Research Design
The large degree of skewness and non-normality in the deal characteristics noted in Table 1 and the wealth effects noted in Table 2 , suggest that parametric tests may not be appropriate. We did, however, conduct standard parametric analyses in the form of multivariate regressions. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficients were highly unstable in that any alteration in model specification resulted in significant changes in the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients. More importantly, as argued earlier, given that the financial advisors are for opposing (bidder and target) parties in the takeover, a multivariate regression analysis is unlikely to discern relations between client wealth effects and advisor
characteristics. Therefore, we analyze median values using non-parametric tests for different subsets of the sample. These subsets control for various combinations of financial advisor choices. This method, in addition to being an appropriate response to the nature of the data, allows us to control for different scenarios, although not in a single test.
We offer the following schematic for analyzing the role of financial advisors in takeover contests. The takeover related variables with which we expect financial advisor participation and reputation to be associated are classified into two broad categories: takeover deal characteristics and wealth effects. In the former, we include the firm size of the target (TVAL) and the bidder (BVAL), the level of toehold ownership by the bidder in the target (PHLD), the presence of multiple bidders (DMUL), and the level of complexity of the deal (CPLEX). The definitions of these variables are as described earlier in the section. Wealth effects are of two types, absolute and relative. Absolute wealth effects are the abnormal wealth changes of the target (AWT) and the bidder (AWB) shareholders as well as the combined wealth change (AWC). Relative wealth effects are designed to measure the amount of wealth that one party in the deal, target or bidder, obtains at (seemingly) the expense of the other party. Hence, relative wealth effects are a measure of the bargaining ability of the firm and its advisors. Relative wealth effects are measured by the two variables described earlier,
WDIFF and BPROP.
The decision to engage the services of an advisor in a takeover, by either the bidder or the target, is complex. This choice is further complicated by the financial advisor decision of the other party in the takeover deal. In a takeover contest, there may be four basic levels of advisor participation: (i) NEITHER: those contests in which neither the bidder nor the target has an advisor, (ii) TARONLY: only the target employs an advisors, (iii) BIDONLY: only the bidder decides to employ an advisor, and (iv) BOTH: advisors are utilized by both the bidder and the target. These different levels of advisor participation allow us to gain insight into the decision process to employ an advisor. The deal characteristics and wealth effects described above are analyzed for the different levels of financial advisor participation as well as for the differing levels of financial advisor reputation.
A numerical breakdown of the sample by advisor involvement is provided in Table 3 .
In our sample of successful takeovers, while a majority of the contests involve advisors to both bidders and targets, we see significant frequencies for all possible combinations of bidder and target financial advisor choices. Of the 282 successful takeovers in our sample, in 33 (11.7 percent) contest neither the bidder nor the target has an advisor. In 46 (16.3 percent) deals, only the target employs an advisor, whereas in 30 (10.6 percent) deals only the bidder employs an advisor. Both the bidder and the target employ advisors in 173 (61.3 percent)
contests.
Our analysis also incorporates the differing levels of financial advisor reputation. We employ two measures of financial advisor reputation. The first is the dichotomous classification into bulge and non-bulge bracket. We analyze the relation between this measure of reputation with both deal characteristics and wealth effects for cases when the target retains an advisor as well as when the bidder retains an advisor. In doing so, we control for the three possible advisor choices of the opponent, namely, no-advisor, non-bulge advisor, and bulge advisor. The advisor reputation classification on the basis of bulge and non-bulge bracket advisors is due to Hayes (1971) and is similar to the approach in Servaes and Zenner (1996) and Bowers and Miller (1990) . The bulge bracket consists of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Merrill Lynch. All other advisors are classified as non-bulge advisors. Table 4 presents information regarding the involvement of bulge and non-bulge advisors in the takeovers in our sample. Of the 46 (30) deals in which only the target (bidder) employed an advisor, bulge advisors were utilized in 11 (13) Utilizing the market share of the advisor as the measure of financial advisor reputation, we compute the average reputation for target (bidder) advisors for our sample of takeover deals. In the event that the number of advisors is greater than one, the reputation of each of the advisors is computed and the final assigned reputation is the average of the advisors' reputation measures. The purpose behind this analysis is twofold: (i) it provides information regarding the reputations of the advisors representing the opposing parties in the deal and (ii) it allows us to check the correspondence between our two measures of reputation (bulge/non-bulge versus market share). For those deals in our sample in which the target employed an advisor, we find that the average reputation (market share) of the target advisor was 9.60 percent and the median value was 9.14 percent. In the sub-sample of deals in which the bidder had an advisor, the average reputation of the bidder advisor was 9.01 percent and the median value was 8.52 percent. It, therefore, appears that targets tend to employ more highly reputed advisors than do bidders. When both the target and the bidder employ an advisor, the target advisor reputation is higher in 104 deals and the bidder reputation is higher in 69 deals. 16 These numbers indicate a reasonably strong correspondence between the market share proxy and the bulge/non-bulge proxy for advisor reputation. Recall from Table   4 that when both the bidder and the target have advisors, the target had a bulge advisor in 90
(30 + 60) deals whereas the bidder for 83 (49 + 34) deals. The number of deals in which the target had a bulge and the bidder had non-bulge advisors (60) far exceeded the number of deals in which the bidder employed the more prestigious advisor (34).
Deal Characteristics, Wealth Effects, and Advisor Participation
This section presents our analysis of the differences in characteristics of deals as well as differential wealth effects for the target as well as the bidder for the four levels of advisor participation described earlier: NEITHER, TARONLY, BIDONLY, and BOTH.
Deal Characteristics
The deal characteristics analyzed are: (i) TVAL, the market value of equity of the target, (ii) BVAL, the market value of the equity of the bidder, (iii) RELSIZE, the ratio of BVAL to TVAL, (iv) DMUL, the dummy variable denoting multiple bidders, (v) PHLD, the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer, and (vi) CPLEX, the measure of complexity of the deal.
We analyze differences in deal characteristics among the four levels of advisor participation in order to provide some insight into the role that financial advisors play in the takeover process. In particular, it is possible to discern whether advisor participation affords the client any advantage in terms of "leveling the playing field." The firm size variables 16 In the above analysis, we also compute financial advisor reputation as the advisor's market share in the year of the deal and as the advisor's three-year moving average market share relative to the deal. The three-year moving average market share is computed as follows. Let the announcement of a tender offer for a target's shares by a bidder be made in month m of year y. Further, let MS y denote the market share of a financial advisor in year y. Then, the reputation REP m,y of the financial advisor, of the target as well as of the bidder, in month m of year y is computed as follows:
The disadvantage of using the three-year moving average proxy is that it forces our sample period to be shorter (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) and we lose 29 deals from the sample. We essentially arrive at similar inferences using the oneyear, the three-year, or the average yearly, market share proxy for reputation.
TVAL and BVAL are a measure of the absolute level of bargaining power in the sense that firm size should be directly correlated with how "deep" are the pockets of the two parties in the takeover. Under the maintained assumption that firm size measures bargaining power in a takeover, RELSIZE, on the other hand, is a measure of the relative bargaining power of the bidder, the higher the value of RELSIZE, the higher the bidder's bargaining power. The analysis of the variable DMUL vis-à-vis advisor participation has the propensity to offer some insights into the takeover process. The presence of multiple bidders increases the likelihood that the target will obtain most of the gains from the takeover. The marginal benefit to the target from retaining an advisor, therefore, should be relatively low when there are multiple bidders. The existence of such an auction, on the other hand, increases the acquiring firm's need for the services of an advisor.
The level of toehold ownership by the bidder in the target firm would give the bidder an advantage for two reasons. First, the bidder needs to obtain fewer shares to gain control of the firm. Second, and more important, the higher the value of PHLD, the greater the profit that the bidder obtains from the takeover. Thus, the higher the level of PHLD, the higher (lower) the marginal benefit of employing an advisor for the target (bidder). Given the components of CPLEX, it is apparent that the more complex the deal, the higher are the expected transaction costs. Thus, we would expect more complex deals to be associated with financial advisors. CPLEX may also work in a different way. A more complex transaction, due to the target's anti-takeover defense mechanisms, state anti-takeover laws, pending litigation in the deal, etc., may give the target more time to evaluate the deal, plan its response strategy, and search for alternative bidders. Arguably, therefore, a higher value for CPLEX may give a bargaining advantage to the target. This logic suggests that we would observe the bidder employing a financial advisor in a complex deal to "level the playing field."
The findings from our analysis are presented in Table 5 . In each of the four panels of the table, the second column B reports median values for the deal characteristics for one of the four categories and this category is denoted as the base category for that panel. Since the size of the target as well as that of the bidder are the smallest in this category, it appears that deals in which both the target and the bidder are small are less likely to involve advisors. This inference is further corroborated by the fact that there are no systematic differences in RELSIZE for this category and that for the others. The median for DMUL for the NEITHER category is significantly greater than that for TARONLY and BOTH categories. This finding indicates that a target firm is less likely to employ the services of an advisor when there are multiple bidders. The presence of multiple bidders has been shown to result higher gains in a takeover accruing to the target. 17 The fact that a target is less likely to employ an advisor when there are multiple bidders, therefore, indicates that one of the reasons for utilizing an advisor may be to garner a larger proportion of the takeover gains. Since the presence of multiple bidders ensures that the target will obtain most of the gains, it may reduce the incentive for the target to employ an advisor. For this very reason, however, a bidder should be induced to employ an advisor to increase its share of the takeover gain in multiple bid contests. Our finding that the incidence of multiple bidders for BIDONLY (Panel C), while not significant at conventional levels (Z-score = 1.27), is greater than for the NEITHER category, supports this conjecture. Finally, the results in the last row of panel A indicate that financial advisor participation is more likely in complex deals.
The findings from the analysis when the base category for comparison is TARONLY are presented in Panel B of Table 5 . The following regularities are immediately apparent for TARONLY contests. The market value of the target (TVAL) is significantly lower than in BIDONLY and BOTH deals. The relative size of the bidder (RELSIZE), on the other hand, is 17 See Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). significantly greater than in these same two categories. The incidence of multiple bidders is lower than in NEITHER and BIDONLY categories. The level of toehold ownership by bidder (PHLD) is greater than that in all the other categories but is significantly so only with respect to the BOTH category of deals. Finally, CPLEX is smaller relative to the BOTH category.
The findings with respect to TVAL and RELSIZE, in particular RELSIZE, provide an interesting insight into the possible role of bargaining power in takeover contests. Under the assumption that larger market value of equity represents "deeper pockets," when the target is smaller and the bidder is relatively larger, the bargaining power rests with the bidder. In such cases, the target appears to be more likely to recruit the services an advisor. The finding that PHLD is the highest in the TARONLY category is consistent with the role of toehold ownership postulated in the literature. It has been demonstrated that the higher the toehold level, the higher is the probability of success of a takeover as well as higher are the relative takeover gains to the bidder. Because of both these possibilities, when toehold level is high, the target is more likely to utilize the services of an advisor. Panels C and D present the findings from the analyses for the BIDONLY and BOTH categories, respectively. The earlier discussion for the NEITHER and TARONLY categories has already described the inferences for most of the significant results in these panels. The further noteworthy inferences here are (i) DMUL is larger for BIDONLY deals than for TARONLY and BOTH deals, and (ii) the BOTH category deals appear to have the highest levels of complexity. The former is consistent with the notion that the bidder firm is at a relative disadvantage in multiple-bid contests and, hence, is more likely to need an advisor.
The latter finding simply indicates that the more complex the takeover contest, the more likely are targets and bidders to employ advisors.
In summary, the results reported in Table 5 , therefore, offer the following simple and intuitively appealing aspect of the role of financial advisors in takeover contests. The main reason that an advisor is utilized appears to be to "level the playing field." Whenever a target, either because of its relatively smaller size or because of a larger bidder toehold, or a bidder, because of the presence of multiple bidders, perceives itself as being in a position of weakness, it employs the services of an advisor.
Wealth effects
In this section, we analyze the differences in the wealth effects of takeovers among the four categories of advisor participation. The wealth effects of a takeover are broadly classified into two categories --absolute and relative effects. The change in the wealth of the target (AWT), the bidder (AWB), and the combined wealth gains (AWC) constitute the absolute wealth effects. The relative wealth effects are measured by WDIFF, which the excess of AWB over AWT, and BPROP, which is the proportion of the combined wealth gain accruing to the bidder. The findings from the analyses are presented in Table 6 . Except for the variables used in the analysis, the layout of this table is identical to that of Table 5 .
From the findings reported in the four panels of the table, the following empirical regularities are evident: (i) the gains to the target, AWT, are statistically similar for the NEITHER and TARONLY categories, (ii) AWT is significantly lower for the NEITHER and TARONLY categories than those for the BIDONLY and BOTH categories of deals, (iii) the relative wealth gain to the bidder (WDIFF) appears to be greater in the NEITHER and TARONLY categories than in BIDONLY and BOTH categories, and (iv) combined wealth gains (AWC) are lower in the TARONLY category than in all the other three categories.
The first three findings together highlight an aspect of the role of financial advisors in takeovers that has, thus far, not been recognized in the literature. It appears that the wealth gain to the target is either uncorrelated or possibly negatively correlated to the employing of an advisor by the target. First, the fact that the gains to the target are statistically similar for the deals in the NEITHER and TARONLY categories indicates that the presence of an advisor for the target, when the bidder does not employ an advisor, does not have a significant impact on the target's wealth gain. Further, AWT is significantly lower for TARONLY deals than for BIDONLY deals indicating that the hiring of an advisor is associated with negative rents for the target. Next, the value of WDIFF is higher (less negative) in the TARONLY category than in the BIDONLY group indicating that bidder wealth gains are relatively higher when the target employs an advisor. This finding, along with that for AWT, points to a seemingly perverse role for advisors as far as targets are concerned--targets employ advisors even though targets who use advisors end up worse off than those who do not.
A more likely interpretation of the role of the advisor is, however, consistent with the above seemingly counterintuitive finding. Consider a potential target firm that has a manager who, as has been conjectured in the literature, derives benefits as well as incurs costs from a takeover. The benefits are from the wealth gains to her from the premium in the takeover bid and the costs are the possible loss of her job as a result of the takeover. Suppose that prior to the announcement of a takeover bid, the target does not have a financial advisor and that its shares trade at $20 per share. Now consider the manager's response to a takeover offer within the context of the level of the bid. Suppose that the bid is $50 per share and is, therefore, "very high" and, consequently, the benefit to the manager far outweighs the costs. Now consider the case if the bid had been very low, for instance $22 per share. In this case, the benefit to the manager may not be enough to compensate for possible job loss. Under which scenario, "very high" or "very low" bid, is the target manager more likely to seek the services of a financial advisor? Assuming that a financial advisor has some special abilities in negotiating a better deal for its client, the answer is clearly the "very low" bid scenario. In other words, the target is more likely to hire an advisor when the perceived gains from the takeover are low. 18 If targets do indeed behave in the manner proposed above, then any empirical test of the relation between financial advisor participation and wealth gains to the target will indicate a negative relation. The argument presented above postulates that this negative relation may, however, be symptomatic of a bias resulting from the behavior of target managers rather than a perverse role of an advisor. An analogy with the world of medicine may make this point more succinctly. Suppose an econometrician wanted to determine the relative surgical abilities of cancer surgeons and dental surgeons. If the econometrician utilized patient death rates for the two categories of surgeons in this test, the inference most likely would be that cancer surgeons have very poor surgical abilities. This inference, however, would be incorrect because the patients who go to a cancer surgeon are generally much closer to death than those going to the dental surgeon. 19 We believe that the role of advisors with respect to target firms is similar to the cancer surgeons in the above story. Targets employ advisors only when they perceive that the takeover is not particularly beneficial to them. This interpretation is also consistent with the earlier finding on deal characteristics that targets utilized advisors when they considered themselves to be unfavorably situated vis-à-vis the bidder.
Deal Characteristics and Wealth Effects for Bulge/Non-bulge Advisors
18 Note that the target, in most cases, does not choose the bidder but simply responds to an offer by the bidder.
We now analyze the effect of advisor reputation on the characteristics and wealth effects of takeover contests. As mentioned in the introduction, we utilize two measures of advisor reputation -non-bulge versus bulge advisors and advisor market share. In this section, we focus on the former dichotomous proxy in which the advisor is deemed to be of higher reputation if it belongs to the bulge category.
The analysis of the effects of financial advisor reputation in takeovers is more complicated than that related to advisor participation in the previous section. The main reason for this complication is that in each part of the analysis, the choice of non-bulge versus bulge by the other side must be factored into the analysis. For example, in studying the effect on target wealth of the target's choice of a bulge versus a non-bulge advisor, the three possible choices of the bidder, no-advisor or bulge-advisor or non-bulge advisor, must be controlled for in the test. We first consider cases in which one of the parties, bidder or target, has chosen not to utilize the services of an advisor, and then cases in which both parties have advisors.
When only the bidder or the target employs an advisor
Clearly, there are two cases to consider -one where only the target employs an advisor and the other when only the bidder has an advisor. For each case, we investigate whether there are systematic differences in deal characteristics or wealth effects depending on whether non-bulge or bulge advisors are employed. In making inferences in this, and the next, section, we assume that a target makes the decision regarding seeking outside financial advice in response to the advisor choice of the bidder. This assumption is clearly arbitrary and is necessitated by the lack of accurate information regarding when a target or a bidder employed an advisor. Casual observation and anecdotal evidence seem to indicate that this assumption may in fact be reasonably close to reality. This assumption is particularly palatable for our sample since we only consider tender offers in which the takeover process is typically initiated by the bidder and the target responds.
The results for differences in deal characteristics are presented in Table 7 , where Panels A and B represent the cases of the TARONLY and BIDONLY subsamples, respectively. In each panel, the third row presents the non-parametric Wilcoxon two-sample Z-scores for differences in distributions. From the values presented in Panel A, we note that when bulge advisors are employed, TVAL is larger and RELSIZE is smaller. Since the size of the bidder is not significantly different between the two groups, it is reasonable to infer that the significant difference in RELSIZE is simply due to the fact that larger targets choose bulge financial advisors. Further, there are no significant differences between non-bulge and bulge advisor groups for the remaining deal characteristics (DMUL, PHLD, and CPLEX). It, therefore, appears that when the target is facing a takeover bid from a bidder who has chosen not to utilize an advisor, the target's choice of non-bulge versus bulge advisor is determined by its size. In analyzing the bidder's choice of an advisor (Panel B), bulge advisors are employed when both bidder and target sizes are large. The hypothesis that the higher reputation of bulge advisors is based on their possessing special abilities finds some support in the finding that the incidence of multiple bidders is higher in the bulge advisor group.
The effect of advisor prestige on shareholder wealth when only the target or the bidder employs an advisor is presented in Table 8 . The variables AWT and AWB are absolute wealth effects on the target and the bidder, respectively. The combined wealth effect AWC, in addition to being an absolute wealth effect, can also be interpreted as being symptomatic of the "search" function of financial advisors, in particular, the abilities of bidder advisors to search for and identify larger synergies. The last two wealth effect variables, WDIFF and BPROP, are measures of the relative gain to the bidder, and attempt to capture the bargaining abilities of the firms and/or their advisors. From the values presented in Panel A, it is apparent that when the target chooses an advisor given that the bidder does not have one, there are no significant differences in the wealth effects for the two levels of advisor prestige.
The lack of significant differences is in keeping with our earlier inference that advisor participation is primarily to level the playing field. It is, however, noteworthy that the median value for AWT is greater, and those for AWB, WDIFF, and BPROP smaller for the non-bulge sample than for the bulge sample. Although not statistically significant at standard levels, these findings weakly support the conjecture that employing a more prestigious advisor is beneficial to the target, possibly at the cost of the bidder.
In the sample of firms where only the bidder employs an advisor, there are some significant differences in the wealth effects for the non-bulge and bulge groups (Panel B).
Target and combined wealth gains are significantly greater in the bulge group, whereas AWB is greater but not significantly so at conventional levels. The fact that combined wealth gain in the bulge advisor group (median = $165.61 million) is greater than that in the non-bulge group (median = $5.42 million) is consistent with the conjecture that better-reputed advisors are better at "searching" for better deals. The relative wealth gains to the bidder (WDIFF and BPROP), while not significantly different, are higher when the bidder employs a bulge advisor. A possible summary interpretation of the findings in Panel B is as follows. When a bidder employs a more prestigious advisor, a more valuable (higher AWC) takeover deal results. These higher takeover gains accrue to both the bidder and the target (higher AWT and AWB). It, however, appears to be the case that the bidder's gains are proportionately slightly higher.
When both bidder and target have advisors
Our findings on the effects of advisor reputation (bulge versus non-bulge) when both the bidder and the target employ advisors on deal characteristics and wealth effects are presented in Tables 9 and 10, respectively. When financial advisors are utilized by both the parties in the takeover contest, there are four cases that need to be considered: (i) when both the bidder and the target employ a non-bulge advisor, (ii) when the target employs a bulge advisor but the bidder employs a non-bulge advisor, (iii) when the bidder employs a bulge advisor but the target employs a non-bulge advisor, and (iv) when both the bidder and the target utilize bulge advisors. The findings for the above four cases are presented in Panels A, B, C, and D of Tables 9 and 10, respectively.
In order to determine the effects of financial advisor reputation in takeovers when both the parties employ advisors, the analysis must account for the fact that the target and the bidder, with the help of their advisors, are competing against each other. We accomplish this task by arranging our comparisons of deal characteristics and wealth gains as follows: The above four comparisons focus on the effect of advisor reputation for the target (bidder) keeping the advisor choice of the bidder (target) fixed. Within the context of our assumption stated earlier that the target chooses an advisor in response to the advisor decision of the bidder, the comparisons dealing with the choice of advisor by the target (I and II) are better specified. We present comparisons III and IV primarily for the sake of completeness. 20 In addition, the comparison between Panels B and C allows us to make some extreme comparisons. In Panel B, the target (bidder) is at its strongest (weakest) vis-à-vis advisor reputation and at its weakest (strongest) in Panel C.
Differences in deal characteristics
The findings on the relation between advisor reputation and deal characteristics, when both bidder and target employ advisors, are presented in Table 9 . As mentioned earlier, the four panels of the table respectively cover the four possibilities regarding the choice of financial advisors. The layout of the table is similar to that in Tables 5 and 6 .
Comparing the deal characteristics in Panels A and B, we observe the determinants of the target's choice of bulge/non-bulge advisor conditional on the bidder having chosen a nonbulge advisor. The findings indicate that for the sample where the target has a bulge advisor, TVAL, BVAL, PHLD, and CPLEX are higher and RELSIZE is lower. While PHLD and CPLEX are higher for the bulge sample, the differences are not significant at conventional levels. These findings indicate that larger target firms choose more prestigious advisors.
While this choice may be also be the result of facing larger bidders, the direction of the relation in RELSIZE indicates that this may not be true. When the toehold ownership of the bidder is greater, the target is more likely to choose a bulge advisor. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that a toehold provides a bargaining advantage to the bidder.
Finally, the more complex the deal, the more likely is the target to employ a bulge advisor.
The target, therefore, employs a reputable advisor when transaction costs are expected to be high. This result, however, is inconsistent with the notion that the components of CPLEX give some special bargaining advantage to the target. When the target's bulge/non-bulge choice is evaluated conditional upon the bidder choosing a bulge advisor (Panel C versus D), similar inferences related to bidder size and target size, as made above, are supported.
The analysis of the bidder's bulge/non-bulge choice conditional upon the target choosing a non-bulge advisor (Panel A versus C) indicates that the choice of bulge advisor is primarily associated with the bidder being larger and, the incidence of multiple bids being 20 If, however, the takeover setting is viewed as a Nash Equilibrium, the bidder's strategy for advisor choice must be conditional on an optimal choice, bulge or non-bulge depending upon the circumstances, by the target.
smaller. The first result is consistent with the premise that large firms are more likely to hire a prestigious advisor. Both results, however, fail to support the premise that bidders hire a prestigious advisor to overcome bargaining disadvantages. The bidder's bulge/non-bulge choice is somewhat easier to explain when the target's advisor choice is fixed to be a bulge advisor (Panel B versus D) . Again, bidder size is an important determinant of the choice of a bulge advisor. Interestingly, the levels of toehold ownership by bidders are greater in the non-bulge sample. This finding indicates that higher toehold ownership positions impart levels of bargaining power to the bidder that are sufficient to reduce the need to employ bulge advisors. Finally, the levels of deal complexity are significantly lower for the bulge sample. This regularity is exactly the opposite to that detected for targets. This result is inconsistent with the transaction costs motive for choosing a more reputable advisor as well as the notion that a more complex transaction is expected to shift the advantage to the target firm, thereby necessitating the employment of a more reputable advisor by the bidder. It, therefore, appears that the variables used in the construction of the CPLEX variable empower the bidder more than they do the target. A more likely possibility is that bulge advisors may have avoided representing bidders in complex deals. 21 Comparing deal characteristics when the target is at its strongest (Panel B) relative to when it is at its weakest (Panel C) in terms of advisor reputation, we find that TVAL, DMUL, PHLD, and CPLEX are higher and BVAL and RELSIZE are lower when the target is at its strongest. The finding with respect to PHLD is consistent with the notion that higher toeholds empower the bidder and necessitate the use of better advisors by the target. The finding with respect to CPLEX is again consistent with the conjecture that the target employs a more reputable advisor when transaction costs are expected to be higher, and inconsistent with the idea that a more complex deal shifts the bargaining advantage to the target. The other documented relations are somewhat counterintuitive. In summary, the relations between advisor reputation and deal characteristics are not amenable to a simple and internally consistent explanation. The only deal characteristic that exhibits regularities that are consistent with intuition for both the bidder and the target is PHLD, the level of toehold ownership by the bidder.
Differences in wealth gains
The findings on the relation between advisor reputation and wealth gains when both bidder and target employ advisors are presented in Table 10 The relations between bidder advisor reputation and wealth gains exhibit almost no systematic patterns. The only significant result is that conditional on the target having a nonbulge advisor, the wealth gain to the target is greater when the bidder has a bulge advisor.
This finding is contrary to the positive role postulated for advisor reputation and client wealth gains. In summary, similar to the finding in Servaes and Zenner (1995) , we find almost no relation between bidder advisor reputation and gains to the bidder. When attention is focused on the targets, we find strong support for the postulated positive relation between advisor reputation and client wealth gains. Our evidence points not only to the fact that more reputable target advisors generate larger wealth gains to the target but also to the fact that these advisors are able to extract at least a part of these gains at the cost of the bidders.
Wealth Gains when Reputation is Proxied by the Advisor's Market Share
In the previous section, we analyzed the relation between financial advisor reputation and takeover deal characteristics and wealth gains where reputation was a dichotomous variable --bulge or non-bulge. The purpose of this section is to analyze whether there is a relation between the reputation, as measured by market share, of a financial advisor and the wealth accruing to their clients in takeover deals. To examine this issue, we rank advisors on the basis of their reputations and determine how this reputation ranking correlates with the wealth gains to their clients. We use the average market share proxy for advisor reputation.
As previously described, this proxy for reputation was computed as the average market share for each advisor for the years they were in the SDC database over our sample period. From these computations, we assign an overall reputation rank for each advisor--the higher the average market share, the higher the reputation. The firm of Goldman, Sachs with a market share of 20.14 percent leads the list, followed by CS First Boston/Credit Suisse, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Brothers, Lehman Brothers, and Lazard Houses in the next five ranks.
Thus, Merrill Lynch is ranked seventh and is the only bulge bracket advisor which is not in the top five according to our alternative method for assigning reputation.
The analysis in this section is conducted separately for the targets and the bidders. Table 11 presents our findings for the relation between advisor reputation and wealth gains for target firms. There were twenty advisors who were involved in at least three deals when the client was a target in a takeover contest. The rest are collected into the "others" category. The first three columns of the table provide the names, the market shares and the number of deals that the advisors were involved as target advisors. The firm of Goldman, Sachs, was, by far, the one that represented targets the most-in a total of 47 deals. As will become evident when we next present similar numbers for bidder advisors, while most of the other firms are almost equally likely to represent a target or a bidder, Goldman, Sachs TPROP, whose high values benefit the client, are ranked in descending order; the highest value receiving the first rank. On the other hand, the higher the abnormal wealth gain to the bidder (AWB), assuming that the size of the takeover pie is fixed, lower is the amount that the target obtains. Thus, the median values for AWB, in this case where the client is the target, are ranked in an ascending order--the lowest value is assigned the first rank. 24 The next column is simply the sum of the ranks, and the lower the sum, the better is the performance of the advisor. The last column formalizes this concept by reporting the rank that is determined on the basis of the sum of the ranks in the previous column.
When the client is the target
23 When the analysis is conducted on a sample of only those takeovers in which the combined wealth gain, AWC, was positive, these correlations are significant at conventional levels. 24 Choosing the order for advisors on the basis of AWC is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher the value, the better it is for the target because the pie is bigger. On the other hand, a larger pie may be better for the opponent too. We have assumed that the former effect is more important and have ranked AWC in a descending order similar to that utilized for AWT and other target gains, that is, highest value of AWC is assigned the first rank.
The coefficient of correlation of advisor reputation with the sum of the ranks is significantly negative (ρ = -0.57). Thus, there is strong evidence that advisor reputation, as measured by the advisor's market share, is closely related to the advisor's overall performance in generating wealth gains for its target client. Another interpretation of this finding is that the greater the wealth that the advisor generates for its clients, the higher the advisor's reputation in the market and the more the takeover business that the advisor obtains from target clients. The sum of the ranks seems to be a reasonable composite measure of the advisor's performance in generating wealth gains for the target clients.
The distribution of the ranks in the last column and the ranks for each of the wealth gain variables highlights some regularities. The top five advisors in terms of reputation have composite ranks in the top ten for AWT, WDIFT, and overall rank. The next five advisors in terms of reputation, however, do not fare well in the ranks. In fact, it appears that the following five advisors, rank 11 through 15, appear to have better performance than those ranked five through ten. The performance of those advisors ranked five through ten in terms of reputation appears to be similar to those ranked 16 through 20. Therefore, while the overall correlations reported in the first row of the table do support a positive relation between wealth gains to the target and advisor reputation, it is likely that the relation is non- are not considered, the highest rank easily goes to the firm of Lazard Houses. While we do not report the results for conducting an analysis similar to the one in this section for deal characteristics, we find that when Lazard Houses was the advisor for target, the level of complexity (CPLEX) was the highest. Noting that takeover defenses, and hostile incumbent management constituted, in part, the variable CPLEX, this finding is consistent with the extant view in the literature that the existence of such defensive mechanisms drives the takeover premium higher.
In summary, when the client is the target, we document a significantly positive relation between financial advisor reputation, as measured by advisor market share, and wealth gains to the target. This relation is evident for absolute wealth gains as well as the relative wealth gains that may be attributable to the bargaining ability of financial advisors.
When the client is the bidder
The results from our analysis of the relation between advisor reputation as measured by the advisor's market share, and the absolute and relative wealth gains of the bidder are presented in Table 12 . The layout of the table and the definitions of the variables are similar to those in Table 11 . In this table, since the reference point is the advisor of the bidder, AWB is the wealth gain to the client (the bidder) and AWT is the wealth gain of the opponent (the target). By similar reasoning, relative wealth effects are measured as WDIFB = AWB -AWT and BPROP equals AWB AWC if AWC is positive and equals 1 -AWB AWC if AWC is negative.
The first row of the table, as before, presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficients and their respective significance levels for the relations between advisor reputation and wealth effect variables. Advisor reputation is: (i) significantly positively related to the number of deals, AWT, AWC, and the sum of ranks, (ii) significantly negatively related to WDIFB, and (iii) uncorrelated with AWB and BPROP. Many of these findings are contrary to the predictions of reputation-building models. When the client is the bidder, the opponent is the target and, hence, if the advisor has any bargaining ability, the advisor reputation should be positively related to AWB and negatively related to AWT. Our findings, however, are that advisor reputation is uncorrelated (and the sign is negative) with AWB and significantly positively correlated with AWT. Our results, therefore, imply that the higher the advisor reputation, the higher the wealth gain to the opponent targets and, possibly, lower the wealth gain to the client bidders. Similarly, it is expected that advisor reputation would be positively correlated with both WDIFB and BPROP. Our data, however, indicate that advisor reputation is negatively correlated with WDIFB and uncorrelated (sign is negative) with BPROP. Furthermore, the correlation of advisor reputation with the sum of the ranks is significantly positive.
Thus, overall, the higher the reputation of the advisor that the bidder employs, the worse off the bidder is in terms of relative wealth gains. Bowers and Miller (1990) investigate the effect of advisor reputation on the division of gains between target and bidder shareholders and also report similar findings. Specifically, they find that the presence of a prestigious advisor, with either the target or the bidder, generally results in the target (bidder) garnering a larger (smaller) share of the acquisition gain. These findings are, as are our findings, in fact, counter-intuitive in the context of the reputation building models alluded to earlier in the paper. If the employment of a higher-reputation advisor by a bidder results in a larger appropriation of the gains by the target, it would be rational for a bidder to employ the lowest-reputation underwriter. Perhaps, an analysis of the potentially value-creating role that bidder advisors play in arranging financing for the deal may provide some clues to this puzzle.
The only finding that is consistent with the theoretically conjectured role of advisors is the significantly positive relation with AWC, the combined wealth gain from the takeover.
This finding is consistent with the "better merger" hypothesis, better advisors are able to seek out better mergers. The peculiar non-monotonicity that was detected for the relation between advisor reputation and overall performance when the clients were targets is also evident when the clients are bidders. The overall performance of those ranked six through ten, is worse than those ranked above (one through to five) and those ranked below (11 to 15).
Conclusion
In this article, we study the role of financial advisors in a sample of 282 successful corporate acquisitions through tender offers over the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] . Our analysis distinguishes the advisor's role on the basis of whether the client is the target or the bidder.
We document systematic patterns in takeover deal characteristics and wealth effects vis-à-vis advisor participation as well as advisor reputation.
Our findings on deal characteristics are: (i) deals in which both the target and the bidder are relatively small, are less likely to involve advisors; (ii) a target firm is less likely to employ an advisor when there are multiple bidders; (iii) both the target and the bidder are more likely to employ advisors when the deal is more complex; (iv) the target is more likely to employ a higher-reputation advisor when the bidder has a higher toehold in the target firm;
(v) when the bidder is relatively larger than the target, the target is more likely to employ an advisor; and (vi) a bidder is more likely to employ an advisor, one with a higher reputation, when there are multiple bidders.
We interpret these results as follows. The primary reason that a firm utilizes a financial advisor, or a higher-reputation advisor, is to "level the playing field." Whenever a party in a takeover perceives that it is at a disadvantage, the target because of its relatively smaller size or because of a larger bidder toehold, and the bidder because of the presence of multiple bidders, it employs the services of an advisor, in all likelihood, a prestigious one.
Our findings on wealth effects are as follows: (i) the absolute and relative wealth gains to the target are uncorrelated or possibly negatively correlated with its employing an advisor. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that target firms hire an advisor when the takeover gains are low, thereby, enabling them to capture a higher proportion of the gains from the takeover; (ii) conditional on employing an advisor, the absolute and relative wealth gains to the target are significantly positively associated with the reputation of its advisor; (iii) for the bidder there appears to be no relation between wealth effects and advisor reputation;
(iv) when the client is the target firm, the reputations of advisors as measured by their market shares, are positively associated with the absolute and relative wealth gains that the advisor generates for its clients; and (v) when the bidder is the client, the higher-reputation (market share) advisors have a better ability to find mergers that result in higher overall synergistic gains , i.e., "seek out better mergers."
This paper builds on earlier research by distinguishing the advisor's role on the basis of whether the client is the bidder or the target. In our analysis, we recognize that the presence or absence of an advisor or the level of reputation of the advisor would have different implications for deal characteristics and wealth effects for bidder and target firms. Our analysis also recognizes that the roles of bidder and target financial advisor are inter-linked by being advisors to opposite parties in the same deal. Given the paucity of theoretical models of financial advisor reputation in a takeover context, our results pose interesting directions for future research. On the theoretical side, models that incorporate some of the complexities outlined in our paper, such as controlling for the advisor choice of the opponent, need to be developed. A limitation of our paper that deserves further exploration is whether the bidder's financial advisor creates value by arranging financing for the acquisition. Also of interest would be an examination of whether the roles of advisors are different in mergers, where the contests tend to be friendlier. Finally, the counterintuitive finding that prestigious advisors to bidders create more wealth gains for the targets, possibly at the expense of the bidder, provides an interesting paradox for further investigation. The sample consists of 282 successful tender offers during the period 1984 to 1994. TVAL and BVAL are the market values of target and bidder equity, respectively, RELSIZE is the ratio MVB/MVT. PHLD is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer, PSOT, PTEN, and PPUR are is proportions of target shares sought, tendered, and purchased, respectively. DMUL is a dummy that is one when there are multiple bidders, CPLEX measures the level of complexity of the deal and is the sum of the seven dummy variables that respectively equal one if (i) target management is hostile, (ii) target has antitakeover defense mechanisms in place, (iii) a family owns more than 20 percent of the target, (iv) there is pending litigation with the deal, (v) deal needs regulatory agency clearance, (vi) state has anti-takeover laws and (vii) bidder offer is two-tiered, and are respectively zero otherwise. The sample consists of 282 successful tender offers during the period 1984 to 1994. AWB, AWT, and AWC are the abnormal wealth effects for the bidder, target, and bidder and target combined, respectively, and AWC = AWB + AWT. The abnormal wealth gain for the bidder or the target firm is the product of the CAR and the market value of the outstanding equity as of the sixth day prior to the first announcement of the first bid in the contest, where
where AR i,t = R i,t -α i -b i R m,t , and R i,t is the realized return to firm i on day t, a i and b i are market model parameter estimates for the 240-day period beginning 300 days prior to the first bid, and R m,t is the return to the equally-weighted CRSP market portfolio on day t., and T is the announcement day of the successful offer. For the target, t = 0 is the day the first bid is announced, and for the bidder, t = 0 is the day of the bidder's first bid. The CAR for the combined sample is over the same window as for the target and AR for the combined entity is computed for a value-weighted portfolio of the bidder and the target. A deal is good (bad) if the combined abnormal wealth effect, AWC, is non-negative (negative Target has bulge and bidder has non-bulge advisor 60
Bidder has bulge and target has non-bulge advisor 34
The sample of 249 deals in which an advisor was utilized by at least one of the parties is sorted on the basis of whether the advisor was a bulge or a non-bulge bracket advisor. Bulge advisors are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, and the rest are non-bulge. Bulge advisors are assumed to be more prestigious. The sample consists of 282 successful tender offers during the period 1981 to 1994. TVAL and BVAL are the market values of target and bidder equity, respectively, RELSIZE is the ratio BVAL/TVAL. DMUL is a dummy that is one when there are multiple bidders. PHLD is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. CPLEX measures the level of complexity of the deal and is the sum of the seven dummy variables that respectively equal one if (i) target management is hostile, (ii) target has antitakeover defense mechanisms in place, (iii) a family owns more than 20 percent of the target, (iv) there is pending litigation with the deal, (v) deal needs regulatory agency clearance, (vi) state has anti-takeover laws and (vii) bidder offer is two-tiered, and are respectively zero otherwise. The sample consists of 282 successful tender offers during the period 1981 to 1994. TVAL and BVAL are the market values of target and bidder equity, respectively, RELSIZE is the ratio BVAL/TVAL. DMUL is a dummy that is one when there are multiple bidders. PHLD is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. CPLEX measures the level of complexity of the deal and is the sum of the seven dummy variables that respectively equal one if (i) target management is hostile, (ii) target has anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place, (iii) a family owns more than 20 percent of the target, (iv) there is pending litigation with the deal, (v) deal needs regulatory agency clearance, (vi) state has anti-takeover laws and (vii) bidder offer is two-tiered, and are respectively zero otherwise. Bulge advisors are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Merrill Lynch. TVAL and BVAL are the market values of target and bidder equity, respectively, RELSIZE is the ratio BVAL/TVAL. DMUL is a dummy that is one when there are multiple bidders. PHLD is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. CPLEX measures the level of complexity of the deal and is the sum of the seven dummy variables that respectively equal one if (i) target management is hostile, (ii) target has anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place, (iii) a family owns more than 20 percent of the target, (iv) there is pending litigation with the deal, (v) deal needs regulatory agency clearance, (vi) state has anti-takeover laws and (vii) bidder offer is two-tiered, and are respectively zero otherwise. Bulge advisors are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Merrill Lynch. TVAL and BVAL are the market values of target and bidder equity, respectively, RELSIZE is the ratio BVAL/TVAL. DMUL is a dummy that is one when there are multiple bidders. PHLD is the proportion of target shares held by the bidder prior to the announcement of the tender offer. CPLEX measures the level of complexity of the deal and is the sum of the seven dummy variables that respectively equal one if (i) target management is hostile, (ii) target has anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place, (iii) a family owns more than 20 percent of the target, (iv) there is pending litigation with the deal, (v) deal needs regulatory agency clearance, (vi) state has anti-takeover laws and (vii) bidder offer is two-tiered, and are respectively zero otherwise. Bulge advisors are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Merrill Lynch.
. The sample consists of 219 successful tender offers during the period 1984 to 1994 in which the target employed a financial advisor. For every deal in this sample, the abnormal wealth gain to the target (AWT), the abnormal wealth gain to the bidder (AWB), the combined wealth gain (AWC), WDIFT = AWT -AWB, and TPROP = 1 -AWB AWC if AWC > 0 and TPROP = AWB AWC are computed. The sample is then sorted by financial advisors and median values for each of the twenty financial advisors with three or more deals in the sample (and one category for all others) of AWT, AWB, AWC, WDIFT, and TPROP are computed. First, as reported in column two, financial advisors are ranked according to the average market share over the sample period. Median values and ranks for AWT, AWB, AWC, WDIFT, and TPROP, are reported in the next five columns. The ranking of The sample consists of 203 successful tender offers during the period 1984 to 1994 in which the bidder employed a financial advisor. For every deal in this sample, the abnormal wealth gain to the target (AWT), the abnormal wealth gain to the bidder (AWB), the combined wealth gain (AWC), WDIFB = AWB -AWT, and BPROP = AWB AWC if AWC > 0 and BPROP = 1 -AWB AWC are computed. The sample is then sorted by financial advisors and median values for each of the sixteen financial advisors with three or more deals in the sample (and one category for all others) of AWT, AWB, AWC, WDIFT, and TPROP are computed. First, as reported in column two, financial advisors are ranked according to the average market share over the sample period. Median values and ranks for AWT, AWB, AWC, WDIFT, and TPROP, are reported in the next five columns. The ranking of advisors for all variables except AWT, is by descending order. In the case of AWT, the ranks are assigned according to an ascending order, that is, the bidder advisor with the lowest value for AWT is ranked one. The sum of the ranks for all variables, except market share, is presented in the column titled Σrank. The last column (rankΣ) presents the ranks based on an ascending order of Σrank.
